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EASEMENTS-NEIGHBORLY CONDUCT
RESULTS IN A PRESCRIPTIVE RIGHT
RKO-Stanley Warner Theatres, Inc. (RKO) operated a motion picture
theatre in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, since 1912. Mellon National Bank
and Trust Company (Mellon Bank) owned a bank adjacent to this
theatre since 1935. The theatre and bank buildings existed on a com-
mon building line prior to the demolition of the bank in 1968. RKO-
Theatre had a marquee that extended over the sidewalk in front of its
building. From the time the theatre was erected, RKO had used the
sidewalk and air space in front of the bank to maintain and change
the signs on its marquee. In 1969, the City of Pittsburgh vacated the
sidewalk in front of the bank. Mellon Bank was thereby relieved of the
easement in favor of the public and received a fee simple title to the side-
walk, free of all encumbrances. They planned to construct a new build-
ing which would extend over the 10-foot wide strip that formerly consti-
tuted the public sidewalk. The new bank building would physically pre-
vent RKO from maintaining and changing its signs on the marquee. RKO
alleged that the construction of the new building on the former sidewalk
would interfere with a prescriptive easement in its favor acquired through
uninterrupted, continuous, and adverse use for a period in excess of twen-
ty-one years. RKO sued Mellon Bank, the City of Pittsburgh, and the
Urban Redevelopment Authority of the City of Pittsburgh. The City of
Pittsburgh and the Urban Redevelopment Authority of the City of Pitts-
burgh moved to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, and Mellon
Bank filed an answer and moved for judgment on the pleadings. All three
motions were granted by the district court. On appeal to the United States
court of appeals, the dismissals as to the City of Pittsburgh and the Ur-
ban Redevelopment Authority were affirmed. The dismissal as to Mellon
Bank was vacated and remanded. RKO-Stanley Warner Theatres, Inc., v.
Mellon National Bank and Trust Company, 436 F.2d 1297 (3rd Cir.
1970).
The issue in this case is whether regular use of a public sidewalk to
maintain and change lettering on a marquee will establish a prescriptive
easement in that public sidewalk when title to the walk, which is in pri-
vate hands, is subject to a public easement. The court ruled on the issue
saying, "[E]asements against the abutting owner can be established by
prescription in a sidewalk, so long as the use is outside the scope of the
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public easement."' With the presence of the public easement, the court
was forced to compare the scope of the public easement with the extent
of RKO's private use. If the private use was within the scope of the
public easement, no prescriptive easement would be possible as the use
is then in common with the public. Only where the private use is outside
the scope of the public easement will a prescriptive easement exist. This
seems to require owners of land subject to a public easement to distinguish
between a use that is common to the public and a use which is not. Those
uses not common to the public may ultimately deprive an owner of the
use of his land. This then is not simply a case of easement by prescrip-
tion, because it is complicated by the presence of the public easement in
the sidewalk. The adversity of RKO's use of a ladder on the walk is ob-
scured by the presence of the public use. The decision holds that the use
of a ladder to maintain and change signs is outside the scope of the public
easement and thus is a prescriptive easement against the fee owner. Al-
though the factual situation is limited, the impact on property rights sub-
ject to a public easement is substantial. This note will examine the con-
cepts of common use and adversity and will determine the boundaries
for the scope of the public easement.
RKO-Theatre did not claim an easement against the City of Pittsburgh
but rather against Mellon Bank.2 It is commonly held that no prescrip-
tive right can be acquired against a city or property dedicated to a public
use.8 In Pennsylvania, when a city, by condemnation or dedication, ac-
quires land for a highway, it does not acquire title to the fee.4 The public
acquires only an easement with the fee remaining in the abutting owner
subject to the public easement., The owner of the land retains basic
property rights.
1. RKO-Stanley Warner Theatres, Inc. v. Mellon National Bank and Trust
Co., 436 F.2d 1297, 1303 (3rd Cir. 1970).
2. Id.
3. City of Lynchburg v. Chesapeake and 0. Ry. Co., 170 Va. 108, 195 S.E.
510 (1938). Accord, Randall v. Board of Com'rs of Tippecanoe County, 77 Ind.
App. 320, 131 N.E. 776 (1921); Finch, Pruyn and Co. v. State, 203 N.Y.S. 165,
122 Misc. 404 (1924); Bellenot v. City of Richmond, 108 Va. 314, 61 S.E. 785
(1908); Virginia Hot Springs v. Lowman, 126 Va. 424, 101 S.E. 326 (1919).
4. For the effect of dedication, see, Hoffman v. Pittsburgh, 365 Pa. 386, 75 A.2d
649 (1950); Sterling's Appeal, III Pa. 35, 2 A. 105 (1886); Versailles Township
Authority of McKeesport, 171 Pa. Super. Ct. 377, 90 A.2d 581 (1952). For the
effect of condemnation, see, William Laubach and Sons v. Easton, 347 Pa. 542,
32 A.2d 881 (1943); Breinig v. Allegheny County, 332 Pa. 474, 2 A.2d 842
(1938); 3 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 924 (3rd ed. 1939).
5. Westinghouse Electric Corporation v. U.E.W. Local 601, 353 Pa. 446,
46 A.2d 16 (1946).
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In Westinghouse Electric Corporation v. United Electric Workers Local
601,6 striking workers sat on the sidewalk and refused to allow passage
into the building. There was a question of whether they had unlawfully
seized property belonging to the corporation. The opinion was that "or-
dinarily the title to property abutting on a public highway extends to the
center of the highway, the sidewalk being for all intents and purposes a
part of the owner's premises subject only to the public's easement of pas-
sage."'7 The owner of land does not surrender his title to the land when
it has been subject to an easement by the public. There are also certain
"residue rights"8 in which the owner may exercise full ownership. After
a street has been vacated, the title to the street vests in those persons own-
ing the land abutting on it;9 the owners, thereafter, stand on their private
rights.' 0
Mellon Bank held the title to the sidewalk and had basic property
rights in it, both before and after the sidewalk was vacated. Mellon
Bank's use was not restricted to the scope of the public easement as long
as the use was not inconsistent with the public easement." Likewise,
Mellon Bank could use the sidewalk "in a reasonable manner for a tem-
porary period, and this right is not subservient to the right of the traveling
public."' 12 Since Mellon Bank had property rights in spite of the public
easement, it would follow that these rights could be protected whenever
such protection was needed.
Under a Pennsylvania law, easements can be acquired in property
within the boundaries of the street. 13 To prove such an easement, RKO-
6. Id. Accord, Minnie Creek Drainage District v. Streeter, 327 Ill. 236,
158 N.E. 383 (1927); Sprague v. Nelson, 6 Pa. D.C. 493, 6 Erie Co. 181 (1924).
7. Supra note 5 at 455-56, 46 A.2d at 20.
8. Breinig v. County of Allegheny, 332 Pa. 474, 2 A.2d 842 (1938).
9. Comment, Real Property-Discontinuance of Dedicated Streets-Disposi-
tion of Property, 45 N.C. L. REV. 564 (1967).
10. Roberts v. New York City, 295 U.S. 264 (1935); Chambersburg Shoe Mfg.
Co. v. Cumberland Valley R.R., 240 Pa. 519, 87 A. 968 (1913). Contra, Chichester
v. Kroman, 221 Ala. 203, 128 So. 166 (1930). See generally, 42 CALIF. L. REV.
636 (1954).
11. Supra note 1. Uses "within the scope of the public easement" and uses
"in any manner not inconsistent with the public easement" are different according
to the court. This distinction is vague. Accord, Duquesne Light Co. v. Duff,
251 Pa. 607, 97 A. 82 (1916); Sterling's Appeal, Ill Pa. 35, 2 A. 105 (1886);
Hindin v. Samuels, 158 Pa. Super. 539, 45 A.2d 370 (1946).
12. Supra note 1, at 1303. North Manheim Township v. Arnold, 119 Pa. 380,
13 A. 444 (1888).
13. PA. STAT. tit. 53, § 1948 (1957), which states that where any street has
been lawfully vacated, "any action, at law or equity, by any person, to enforce any
right in said street, . . . or easement in the ground embraced within the boundaries
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Theatre first had to establish to the court's satisfaction all of the elements
of an easement by prescription. In Pennsylvania these are the open,
notorious, continuous, uninterrupted, and adverse use of land for twenty-
one years.'14 The presence of the public easement complicated the
establishment of an easement by prescription. The court said: "Any use
of the sidewalk within the scope of the public easement is not adverse
to Mellon Bank and cannot serve as the basis for the acquisition of a pre-
scriptive easement.""' The court thus seemed to narrow the question to
the existence of adversity. For a use to be adverse it must be against the
rights of the property owner. If a use is considered part of the public
easement, there is no adversity possible because the use is not wrongful
as to the owner.' 6 RKO's success on its claim for a prescriptive easement
depended on the use being outside the scope of the public easement.
Once outside, the use can be adverse to the private rights of the owner.
Any use not within the scope of the public easement is an infringement
on the abutting owner and he may enjoin it.17 Where an abutting owner
has private rights in a street, distinguishable from the rights of the public,
his rights may be acquired by adverse possession."' Mellon Bank thus
had certain private property rights-those outside the scope of the public
easement-in which RKO could acquire prescriptive easement rights.
The critical point is what the scope of the public easement is and what
uses lie within it.
Certain uses of a sidewalk fall into a borderline category between pub-
lic uses and private uses. In Hindin v. Samuels,19 it was determined that
"[n]o person, corporation, or individual has the right to make a special or
exceptional use of the public highway not common to all citizens except
by grant from the sovereign power."
20
of the same, by reason of ownership of, or interest in, ... shall be brought within
one year after the vacation of said street. . ....
14. Spring City Foundry Co. v. Carey, 434 Pa. 193, 252 A.2d 666 (1969).
See also, Dozier v. Krmpotich, 227 Minn. 503, 35 N.W.2d 696 (1949); Shaffer v.
Baylor's Lake Ass'n, 392 Pa. 493, 141 A.2d 583 (1958); Mitchell v. Bovard, 279 Pa.
50, 123 A. 588 (1924); KRATOVIL, REAL ESTATE LAW, 442-4 (4th ed. 1964); RE-
STATEMENT OF PROPERTY §§ 458-460 (1944); Cook, Legal Analysis in the Law of
Prescriptive Easements, 15 So. CAL. L. REV. 44 (1941); Taylor, Titles to Land by
Adverse Possession, 20 IowA L.R. 551 (1935); 45 N.C. L. REv. 284 (1966).
15. Supra note 1, at 1301. See, RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 458 (1944);
2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 8.55 (A.J. CASNER ed. 1952).
16. Supra note 1, at 1301.
17. Reichert v. St. Louis & S.F. Ry., 51 Ark. 491, 11 S.W. 696 (1889).
18. Rupley v. Fraser, 132 Minn. 311, 156 N.W. 350 (1916). Cf. Hoxie v.
Gibson, 150 Ark. 432, 234 S.W. 490 (1921).
19. 158 Pa. Super. Ct. 539, 45 A.2d 370 (1946).
20. Id. at 542, 45 A.2d at 372.
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The "common" use referred to is the public's common and equal right to
make reasonable use of the highway for ordinary travel and transporta-
tion. 21  The right includes a general "easement of passage" 22 and "the
right to stop temporarily for business necessity, accident or the ordinary
exigencies of travel."'2 3 In Benner v. Junker,24 a bakery loaded its trucks
in front of another's residence and used the sidewalk. The court felt that
occasional loading could be tolerated; "but when it is done continually,
day after day, then it becomes an appropriation of the plaintiffs' property
by the defendant for the purposes of his business, [and] an invasion of
the plaintiffs' right of property .... ,,25 Thus, reasonable commercial
needs requiring temporary obstructions are permitted 26 and are within
the scope of the public easement.27 However, constantly recurring, al-
though temporary, obstructions are not within the scope of the public
easement. In light of these two types of temporary obstructions, the use
of RKO's ladder is not to be considered within the scope of the public
easement. The reasonableness of this determination will be examined
next.
Once the public has acquired an easement for land to be used as a
highway or sidewalk, no person has the right to use the easement to the
exclusion of the public, or use it permanently for private purposes. 28
Generally speaking, the public has rights to unobstructed and uninter-
rupted use of the highway or sidewalk.29 But this is not to say that any
interference or obstruction of the highway or sidewalk is illegal or a nui-
sance. The rights of the public can be invaded if justified on the ground
of necessity.30  In Commonwealth v. Passmore,31 the defendant placed
21. City of Boston v. N.W. Perry, Inc., 304 Mass. 18, 22 N.E.2d 627 (1939);
In Re Opinion of the Justices, 297 Mass. 559, 8 N.E.2d 179 (1937); Common-
wealth v. Surridge, 265 Mass. 425, 164 N.E. 480 (1928).
22. Supra note 5, at 456, 46 A.2d at 20.
23. Supra note 8, at 479, 2 A.2d at 846-47.
24. 190 Pa. 423, 43 A. 72 (1899).
25. Id. at 426, 43 A. at 73.
26. City of Birmingham v. Hood-McPherson Realty Co., 233 Ala. 352, 172 So.
114 (1937).
27. North Manheim Township v. Arnold, 119 Pa. 380, 13 A. 444 (1888).
28. White v. State, 99 Ga. 16, 26 S.E. 742 (1896); Silverman v. Usen, 128
Me. 349, 147 A. 421 (1929); Theobold v. Louisville, N.O. & T. Ry. Co., 66 Miss.
279, 6 So. 230 (1889); Jaynes v. Omaha Ry., 53 Neb. 631, 74 N.W. 67 (1898);
O'Hanlin v. Carter Oil Co., 54 W. Va. 510, 46 S.E. 565 (1904).
29. People v. Amdur, 123 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 951, 267 P.2d 445 (1954); City of
Chicago v. Rhine, 363 Ill. 619, 2 N.E.2d 905 (1936).
30. Cloverdale Homes v. Town of Cloverdale, 182 Ala. 419, 62 So. 712
(1913); Harbuck v. Richland Box Co., 204 Ga. 352, 49 S.E.2d 883 (1948); Rief v.
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certain goods he intended to auction on the sidewalk. The goods ren-
dered public passage less convenient but did not entirely obstruct it.
The court held the use unlawful but went on to say that necessity will
justify actions which may otherwise be nuisances. Also, the necessity
need not be absolute; it must only be reasonable. The court set down a
few examples it considered reasonable uses of the public sidewalk: build-
ing materials, provided they were placed in a reasonable manner and
used within a reasonable time, and goods placed by merchants for the
purpose of moving them into or out of the building within a reasonable
time. The court said:
If necessity is obvious, and the privilege used in a reasonable manner, so as to in-
commode as little as possible the neighborhood and others, the general rule is so far
disbursed with, up the principles of private as well as public convenience.3 2
In Brey v. Rosenfeld,3 3 a truck was parked at right angles to the curb,
which partly blocked the street; and the driver was delivering cement to
a building through a chute, which entirely blocked the sidewalk. The
court held that there was no evidence that the driver was unlawfully using
the public easement to unload the cement. The court held: "Temporary,
reasonable and necessary obstructions of a public highway, and there need
be no absolute necessity, are not invasions of the public easement of
travel; a reasonable necessity is sufficient."'3 4 The delivery of materials
across the sidewalk by means of a chute which did not take an unrea-
sonable time was thus considered a mere temporary inconvenience to
travelers. The use was not unlawful and not a nuisance and was within
the scope of the public easement.3 5  It thus appears lawful for persons
and property to be temporarily at rest on the public streets and sidewalks
if no unreasonable obstruction or use occurs. Reasonable has been de-
fined as "according to the usages of reasonable men, having due regard
for the public convenience." 36  This definition was used in Fisher v. Los
Mountain State Tel. and Tel. Co., 63 Idaho 418, 120 P.2d 823 (1941); But see,
Young v. Rothrock, 121 Iowa 588, 96 N.W. 1105 (1903).
31. 1 S. & R. 217 (Pa. 1814). See also, Smith v. Locke Coal Co., 265 Mass.
524, 161 N.E. 381 (1929).
32. Commonwealth v. Passmore, supra, note 31 at 220.
33. 72 R.I. 28, 48 A.2d 177 (1946).
.34. Id. at 31-32, 48 A.2d at 179. See also, Tolman Co. v. City of Chicago,
240 I11. 268, 88 N.E. 488 (1909); 3 DILLION ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 1168
(5th ed. 1911).
35. Smith v. Locke Coal Co., 265 Mass. 524, 161 N.E. 381 (1929); O'Neill v.
City of Port Jervis, 253 N.Y. 423, 171 N.E. 694 (1930); Gates & Son Co. v. City
of Richmond, 103 Va. 702, 49 S.E. 965 (1905).
36. N.W. Longenecker v. Wichita Railroad & Light Co., 80 Kan. 413, at 420,
102 P. 492, at 495 (1909).
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Angeles Pacific Co.,37 where the defendant placed freight on the sidewalk
for forty minutes and the plaintiff was injured when he stumbled over it.
The case involved an alleged act of negligence committed by the defend-
ant. In applying the reasonable use test, the court reasoned that the side-
walk would be of no use to abutting owners if it could not be used for
an "appreciable period of time," 38 since, in transporting goods to and
from the store, it is at times necessary to deposit them on the sidewalk.
It would seem, then, that the reasonableness of the use of a public
easement depends on a number of factors. The characterization and
propriety of any particular use will depend on the amount of time it re-
quires, its degree of necessity, where the use takes place, and all attendant
and surrounding circumstances. 39 Owners of businesses which abut on
the public easement of a highway and sidewalk are in a peculiar predica-
ment. They are faced with the public's paramount right to unobstructed
travel while at the same time, they at times, need the use of the sidewalk
and street for business purposes. Although the courts have held that
the fundamental right of enjoyment of the highway and sidewalks is in
the public, 40 the owners of land abutting on sidewalks or streets may be
permitted to encroach or obstruct them to a limited extent for necessary
business purposes as long as these purposes do not interfere unreasonably
with the public right of travel. 41
No one has an inherent right to conduct a private business on the
public streets or sidewalks or obstruct permanently the sidewalks or
streets; 42 but one may use the streets and sidewalks to some extent to bar-
ter, trade, or prosecute his business or trade to a reasonable degree. 43  Of
course, the rights of an abutting owner to use the public easement for
business purposes is not determined by the nature or character of his
business, but rather by the extent to which the public is inconvenienced
or the extent to which the reasonable enjoyment of adjacent property
37. Fisher v. Los Angeles Pacific Co., 21 Cal. App. 677, at 682, 132 P. 767, at
769 (1913).
38. Id. at 682, 132 P. at 769.
39. Harold v. Jones, 86 Ala. 274, 5 So. 438 (1889); Flynn v. Taylor, 127 N.Y.
596, 28 N.E. 418 (1891).
40. See, e.g., People v. Amdur, supra, note 29; Chicago v. Rhine, supra, note 29.
41. Tolman & Co. v. City of Chicago, 240 Ill. 268, 88 N.E. 488 (1909); Etchi-
son v. Frederick City, 123 Md. 283, 91 A. 161 (1914); Flynn v. Taylor, 127 N.Y.
596, 28 N.E. 418 (1891); McCarten v. Flagler, 69 Hun. 134, 23 N.Y.S. 263 (Sup.
Ct. 1893).
42. Clem v. LaGrange, 169 Ga. 51, 149 S.E. 638 (1929); People v. Wolper,
350 Ill. 461, 183 N.E. 451 (1932).
43. Henkel v. Detroit, 49 Mich. 249, 13 N.W. 611 (1882).
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is infringed.4 4  In a municipality, abutting owners have a limited right
to use the street and sidewalk for business purposes in a reasonable man-
ner and for temporary periods of time.4 5 Reasonable business needs and
lawful obstructions of the public easement have included, among other
things, temporary loading and unloading of merchandise, 46 depositing
building materials, 47 goods, and fuel,48 and vehicles standing for a reason-
able time. 49
There is a definite policy underlying what is a reasonable use and what
is an unreasonable use of public easements. As modes of commerce in-
crease and change, uses of the public easement once considered a bur-
den on the abutting owner, are no longer strictly limited to the uses of
public travel. 0 Abutting owners of businesses can obstruct the street and
sidewalk and interfere with the public right of travel and still be within
the lawful use of the public easement. It is only when the use of the
highway is beyond the scope of the easement that a user commits a wrong
against the owner of the fee.51 Unreasonable business needs and unlaw-
ful obstruction of the public easement have included, among other things,
maintaining a place of private business in front of another property,
2
permanent buildings and other structures,5 3 projections over highway,5 4
44. Knapp & Cowles Mfg. Co. v. New York, N.H. & H.R. Co., 76 Conn. 311,
56 A. 512 (1903); Brauer v. Baltimore Refrigerating & Heating Co., 99 Md. 367,
58 A. 21 (1904); James v. Burchett, 15 Wash. 2d 119, 129 P.2d 790 (1942).
45. Breinig v. County of Allegheny, 332 Pa. 474, 2 A.2d 842 (1938). Ac-
cord Lane v. San Diego Electric Ry., 208 Cal. 29, 280 P. 109 (1929); City of
Evansville v. Cunningham, 138 Ind. App. 39, 202 N.E.2d 284 (1964); Kelly v.
Otterstedt, 80 N.Y.S. 1008, 80 App. Div. 398 (1903); Plummer v. Village of Swan-
ton, 133 Ohio 623, 15 N.E.2d 349 (1938); Rose v. Abeel Bros., 4 Tenn. App.
431 (1927).
46. Haggenjos v. City of Chicago, 336 Il1. 573, 168 N.E. 661 (1929); Gerdes v.
Christopher & Simpson Architectural Iron & Foundry Co., 124 Mo. 347, 27 S.W.
615 (1894); Rachmel v. Clark, 205 Pa. 314, 54 A. 1027 (1929).
47. Haggenjos v. City of Chicago, supra, note 46; Gerdes v. Christopher &
Simpson Architectural Iron & Foundry Co., supra, note 46; Rachmel v. Clark,
supra, note 46.
48. Piollet v. Simmers, 106 Pa. 95, 51 Am. R. 496 (1884); Loberg v. Town of
Amherst, 87 Wisc. 634, 58 N.W. 1048 (1894).
49. Lane v. San Diego Electric Ry., 208 Cal. 29, 280 P. 109 (1929).
50. Pittsburg Nat'l Bank v. Equitable Gas Co., 421 Pa. 468, 220 A.2d 12
(1966); See, 96 U. PA. L. REV. 256 (1947).
51. State v. Muola, 119 Conn. 323, at 326, 176 A. 401, at 403 (1935).
52. Bell Bros. Trucking Co. v. Kelly, 277 Ky. 781, 127 S.W.2d 831 (1939);
Commonwealth v. Surridge, 265 Mass. 425, 164 N.E. 480 (1929).
53. Capital Transit Co. v. Hazen, 93 F.2d 250 (D.C. Cir. 1937); Simpson v.
Adkins, 386 Il1. 64, 53 N.E.2d 979 (1944).
54. National Sign Co. v. Board of Com'rs of Douglas County, 126 Kan. 81,
266 P. 927 (1928).
602 [Vol. XXI
ditches and excavations under or across highways, 55 fences, gates, and
walks. 56
More specifically, in the case of the public easement in a sidewalk,
there is again a primary right in the public for travel. 57 Any obstruc-
tions, even temporary or partial, must be in a reasonable manner so as
not to interfere with the public rights or safety.58 However, incidental
and partial obstructions of necessity are permitted if not prolonged.59
The placing of a ladder upon the sidewalk by an abutting owner, to enable
him to reach a sign on the front of the building, is not an unlawful or un-
usual use as decided in Press v. Penny.60  In Press v. Penny, the defend-
ant was in the dry goods business and was located on a busy public
street. The defendant had a muslin advertisement sign stretched on a
wooden frame 12 feet long and 5 feet wide tacked above the first
story of the building. The defendant had contracted with a paint
company to change and remove the signs as business required. To re-
move the sign, two ladders were used which were rested against the build-
ing so that they stood on the sidewalk about 5 feet from the building.
During one such removal, one of the men on the ladder pulled too hard
on a nail causing him to lose his balance, fall, and injure the plaintiff
who was passing by on the sidewalk below. The "method adopted for
removing the sign by the use of the ladder resting upon the sidewalk was
a usual one.' ' 61 The issue of this case was whether the use of the sidewalk
in such a manner infringed upon the right of the plaintiff as a traveler
upon the street. The court recognized two classes of rights being co-ex-
istent: that of the traveling public, and that of abutting owners, and each
must be exercised with reference to the other. Although the public de-
mands unfettered use for travel, there is "no more useful purpose to
55. Town of Albion v. Ryan, 201 App. Div. 717, 194 N.Y.S. 261 (1922).
56. Rodgers v. Hess, 325 Ill. 603, 156 NE. 811 (1927); Hansen v. Green, 275
Ill. 221, 113 N.E. 982 (1916); Commonwealth v. Marshall, 137 Pa. 170, 20 A. 580
(1890).
57. People v. Amdur, supra note 29; Chicago v. Rhine, supra note 29.
58. Massey v. Worth, 39 Del. 211, 197 A. 673 (1938). Accord, Miller v.
Town of Seaford, 22 Del. Ch. 159, 194 A. 37 (1937) (obstruction of sidewalk is
nuisance).
59. Massey v. Worth, supra note 58.
60. Press v. Penny, 242 Mo. 98, 145 S.W. 458, Annot., 18 A.L.R. 794 (1912).
Accord, Brauer v. Baltimore Refrigerating & Heating Co., 99 Md. 367, 58 A. 21
(1904); Smith v. Locke Coal Co., 265 Mass. 524, 164 N.E. 381, Annot., 61 A.L.R.
1052 (1929); Flynn v. Taylor, 127 N.Y. 596, 28 N.E. 418 (1891); Piollet v.
Simmers, 106 Pa. 95, 51 Am. R. 496 (1884); North Manheim Twp. v. Arnold,
119 Pa. 380, 13 A. 444 (1884).
61. Press v. Penny, supra note 60, at 102, 145 S.W. at 458, 18 A.L.R. at 795.
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which a street may be put in behalf of the abutting proprietor than that
which contributes to the growth and material development of the com-
munities which it serves."16 2 For this reason an abutting owner not only
has a right to transfer goods to and from the street, but to hold goods on
sidewalks for a reasonable time. 6 3  The court held that there was nothing
in the character of the work, if properly performed, or the character of
the place in which it was being done that fixed liability on the defendant.
The court said:
We have seen that in the contracting to have this work done, the Defendants were
clearly within their rights, because the use to which the street would be put in the
proper performance of the contract was one to which it was lawfully subject, and
was not particularly dangerous in its character .... 64
Holding, then, as we do, that the use to which the street was being put in removing
the sign in question was a lawful one, founded upon the easement of access incident
to the abutting property, it necessary (sic) follows that such use and the general use
of the public are mutual and interdependent.65
Reasonable commercial needs requiring temporary obstructions would
thus include the use of a ladder to change signs in front of a business.
This use would be well within the scope of the public easement. In the
instant case, RKO v. Mellon, the use of a ladder to maintain and change
lettering on the marquee by RKO was held to be outside the scope of
the public easement and thus an appropriation of Mellon Bank's prop-
erty for business purposes due to the adverse nature of the use. Once the
adverse use was determined, the next logical step was a prescriptive ease-
ment in favor of RKO-Theatre. This reasoning goes against years of
precedent in deciding what is or is not a reasonable use. RKO-Theatre's
use should not have been outside the scope of the public easement nor,
as a consequence, an adverse use against Mellon Bank.
A public easement in a sidewalk or street will permit a wide range of
uses, but these uses must be such as to fall within the general category
of a public use. Ordinarily, a use in common with the public will negate
a presumption in favor of a private use,66 and private prescription is not
possible if the same right is exercised by the public. 67 When a use is
62. Press v. Penny, supra note 60, at 104, 145 S.W. at 459, 18 A.L.R. at 797.
63. Tolman & Co. v. City of Chicago, supra note 41.
64. Press v. Penny, supra note 60, at 105-06, 145 S.W. at 460, 18 A.L.R. at
798.
65. Press v. Penny, supra note 60, at 106, 145 S.W. at 461, 18 A.L.R. at 800.
66. Reid v. Garnett, 101 Va. 47, 43 S.E. 182 (1903). See McKenzie v. Elliott,
134 Ill. 156, 24 N.E. 965 (1890).
67. Pirman v. Confer, 273 N.Y. 357, 7 N.E.2d 262 (1937). See 2 A.L.R.
1368 (1919); 111 A.L.R. 221 (1937).
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outside the scope of the public easement, it is then not common with the
public and is exclusive.68 If a common use does exist, the individual
must clearly indicate his personal claim in order to establish a prescrip-
tive right.6 9 Some decisive act must convey a claim of right against the
owner of the land.70 The characteristics of the use determine whether
an easement has been created. Mere use is not enough, 7 ' especially
where it is connected with a public easement.7 2 Any adverse use should
be objected to by the owner and prevented. However, the public ease-
ment may set up a type of camouflage concealing the adversity of the
use.
There are two problems involved in RKO-Theatre's use of Mellon
Bank's sidewalk to maintain and change its sign when this was done in
common with the many uses available to the public. First, there is the
question of notice. Was this use decisive enough (notorious?) so as to
put Mellon Bank on notice of a claim against it? Second, assuming Mel-
lon Bank was cognizant of the use, was their inaction acquiescence to
RKO-Theatre's claim, in which prescriptive easements will lie,78 or was
their inaction a neighborly indulgence toward RKO-Theatre?
First, as to the question of notice, an adverse use must convey some
notice to the owner. In Gibbs v. Sweet,7 4 a fisherman used a lake to fish
for a period in excess of thirty years. There was no testimony respecting
any actual notice to the owner of the lake that the use was under a claim
of right. The fact that the owner was aware of the man fishing on his
lake did not mean that he was bound to assume that the use was under
a claim of right. The court said:
When the evidence which the claimant produces in support of his alleged right to an
easement fully explains the manner in which the enjoyment began and is not suffi-
cient to warrant a finding that the owner knew or ought to have known that the
use was under a claim of right, the presumption of a grant does not arise. 75
The use must be such that the owner is aware of the user's intention
68. Reid v. Garnett, supra note 66.
69. Pirman v. Confer, supra note 67. Accord, Gion v. City of Santa Cruz,
2 Cal.3d 29, 465 P.2d 50, 84 Cal. Rptr. 162 (1970).
70. Reid v. Garnett, supra note 66. See Board of Education v. Nichol, 70
Ohio App. 467, 46 N.E.2d 872 (1942); KRATOVIL, REAL ESTATE LAW (4th ed. 1964).
71. Shaffer v. Baylor's Lake Ass'n, 392 Pa. 493, 141 A.2d 583 (1958); Shinn v.
Rosenberger, 347 Pa. 504, 32 A.2d 747 (1943); Savage v. Nielsen, 114 Utah 22,
197 P.2d 117 (1948).
72. Pirman v. Confer, supra note 67.
73. Dartnell v. Bidwell, 115 Me. 227, 98 A. 743, Annot., 5 A.L.R. 1320 (1916).
74. 20 Pa. Super. Ct. 275 (1902).
75. Id. at 285.
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so as to protect his property rights. The prescriptive period begins when
a cause of action accrues to the owner. 76  Mellon Bank had failed to
exercise its property rights. They supposedly knew, or ought to have
known, of the use by RKO-Theatre, and that use was outside the scope
of the public easement, and that the use was adverse to them. The
court, in RKO v. Mellon, did not go into any discussion of this assumed
knowledge. The court determined that the use by RKO-Theatre was
outside the scope of the easement, and thus adverse to Mellon Bank.
The only rationale for this was that "[T]he abutting fee owner retains
certain primary rights in the sidewalk, and those rights can be lost by
prescription. ' 77 Mellon Bank was required to know not only if the use
was adverse, but if it was outside the scope of the public easement.
A use generally will not be adverse unless it can reasonably be inter-
preted as adverse.78 The use of the sidewalk by RKO-Theatre might
raise a presumption of adversity. This presumption is rebuttable where
the walk has been used openly, continuously, and exclusively for 20
years; but the origin of such way is not shown. 79  The presumption can
therefore be defeated where the circumstances surrounding the use afford
an explanation that will defeat the presumption. 0 In Umhau v. Buz-
zuro,8 ' there was an isolated alley in a residential block. The alley had
no outlets or means of egress from either end of the block. The alley
had been dedicated as such but never used due to buildings at both ends.
Buzzuro owned the lot that blocked one end of the alley. Many residents,
including Umhau, walked over Buzzuro's lot to get to the adjacent street
from the alley. When Buzzuro graded his lot to construct and run a busi-
ness, the neighbors would not only walk across, but would drive vehicles
to and from the alley over Buzzuro's lot. No permission was ever asked
and none ever expressly granted. The court found that this use was not
76. Cook, supra note 14.
77. RKO-Stanley Warner Theatres, Inc. v. Mellon National Bank and Trust
Co., supra note 1.
78. Bowles v. Chapman, 180 Tenn. 321, 175 S.W.2d 313 (1943). See Reid v.
Garnett, supra note 66, at 49-50, 43 S.E. at 183, where the court said, "Where a
landowner keeps open and uses a way, its enjoyment and use by another in common
with the public must generally be regarded as permissive or under an implied
license, and not adverse, unless there be some decisive act on the part of that other
indicating a separate and exclusive use under the claim of right." See generally
Thomas v. Ford, 63 Md. 346, 52 Am. R. 513 (1884); Polston v. S.S. Kresge Co.,
324 Mich. 575, 37 N.W.2d 638 (1949); 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 8.56
(CASNER ed. 1952).
79. Petersen v. Corrubia, 21 111. 2d 525, 173 N.E.2d 499 (1961).
80. Moore v. Day, 199 App. Div. 76, 191 N.Y.S. 731 (1921).
81. Umhau v. Bazzuro, 133 F.2d 356 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
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of sufficient character to establish a prescriptive easement as such a use
must be accompanied by an assertion of rights adverse to the interests of
the owner and indicate a claim of right. This particular use appeared to
be more of a friendly accommodation, a mere privilege or license. Relying
on other cases, the court felt that this use, being a mere neighborly act,
with no intent on the part of the residents to claim adversity, and no in-
tent on the part of the owner to surrender any rights, could not ripen into
an easement even though no permission had ever been asked. 82
RKO-Theatre and Mellon Bank had buildings existing on a common
boundary line. They both operated businesses there. The RKO-Theatre
needed the sidewalk in front of the Mellon Bank to maintain and change
its marquee signs. Mellon Bank could have prevented this use. From a
business policy standpoint, to prohibit the use would have been poor busi-
ness relations. Viewed from a public acceptance standpoint, a prohibition
would not have been very neighborly. Mellon Bank was in a precarious
position from the start. First, to prohibit RKO-Theatre from using the
sidewalk might mean a strained relationship with its neighbors. To allow
the use of the sidewalk might result in the loss of property rights. The
situation in this case might have begun and continued as a friendly, im-
plicit understanding between neighbors. The ruling in this case has re-
sulted in a prescriptive easement being placed on the land. The facts in
the case do not allude to any tacit agreement, nor do they negate the pos-
sibility of one. The circumstances, however, certainly point to the possi-
bility that the use was mutually advantageous, and if so, it would have
been in the interest of neither party to terminate or restrict the use of
the sidewalk. 83
Secondly, Mellon Bank's inaction to RKO's use could cause one of two
results. One would be acquiescence or submission that would give rise to
a prescriptive easement, all other elements being present. The second
result would be implied permission or license derived from a friendly ac-
commodation. The issue is whether or not a simple awareness of a use
coupled with inaction is tantamount to a failure to assert rights against an
invasion by an adverse claimant. The origin of the use, the relationship
of the parties, and the circumstances generally will control. Acquiescence
by the owner which is necessary to the acquisition of a prescriptive ease-
ment is defined in Hopkins v. Hill8 4 to mean "passive assent or submis-
82. See Stewart v. Andrews, 239 Il1. 186, 87 N.E. 864 (1909); Rose v. City of
Farmington, 196 Il1. 226, 63 N.E. 631 (1902).
83. Shinn v. Rosenberger, 347 Pa. 504, 32 A.2d 747 (1943); Bennett v. Biddle,
140 Pa. 396, 21 A. 363 (1891).
84. 160 Neb. 29, 68 N.W.2d 678 (1955).
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sion, quiescence, consent by silence."", In Hopkins, the plaintiff owned
land over which a road crossed that connected one part of the adjoining
tenant's land to another part. The road was 15 feet wide and the de-
fendant used a distance of 600 feet to move farm equipment and crops
between his two parcels of land. There was no other convenient route be-
tween the two parcels. The owner knew of the defendant's use and defend-
ant had never asked for permission. The court decided that a prescriptive
easement arises when the use is "adverse, under a claim of right, continuous
and uninterrupted, open and notorious, exclusive, and with the knowledge
and acquiescence of the owner of the servient tenement, and must con-
tinue for the full prescriptive period."'8" An owner, to avoid a prescriptive
easement, must show the use was by permission when the use is shown
to be open, continuous, visible, and unmolested since such use will be pre-
sumed to be under a claim of right. The owner was charged with the
knowledge of the use and his acquiescence was implied from the facts of
the case. Inaction in Hopkins had resulted in acquiescence leading to a
prescriptive easement.8 7  There is, however, another interpretation for
inaction. Where a use begins as a permissive use, it cannot ripen into
an adverse use. 88 Mere neighborly accommodation is not a basis for any
subsequent claim of an adverse use89 until a positive notice of adverse
or hostile claim is conveyed to the owner, and the holding continues
thereafter for the statutory period.90 A use which does not show a clear
claim of right that is adverse to the owner is at most a permissive use or a
license. 9 1 In neither neighborly accommodation nor unclear claim of
right will the doctrine of prescription apply. 92 The owner of land should
be allowed to extend to his neighbor friendly access to his land. The
owner should not have to fear an eventual lawsuit for a prescriptive
right. Otherwise, "an act of neighborly kindness may lead to the acqui-
sition of an enforceable legal right to the detriment of the kindly land-
85. Id. at 41, 68 N.W.2d at 685.
86. Id. at 40, 68 N.W.2d at 684.
87. Contra, Hester v. Sawyers, 41 N.M. 497, 71 P.2d 646, Annot., 112 A.L.R.
536 (1937) (permissive use presumed in unenclosed land). See THOMPSON, REAL
PROPERTY § 512, at 621 (Prem. ed. 1924).
88. Williams v. Fears, 248 Ark. 486, 452 S.W.2d 642 (1970); Rita Sales Corp.
v. Bartlett, 129 I11. App. 2d 45, 263 N.E.2d 356 (1970).
89. Savage v. Nielsen, 114 Utah 22, 197 P.2d 117 (1948). See also Johnson v.
Whelan, 171 Okla. 243, 42 P.2d 882, Annot., 98 A.L.R. 1096 (1935).
90. Williams v. Fears, supra note 88.
91. Cincinnati N.O. & T. Ry. v. Sharp, 141 Tenn. 146, 207 S.W. 728 (1918).
92. Condry v. Laurie, 184 Md. 317, 41 A.2d 66 (1945). See Joseph v. Evans,
338 III. 11, 170 N.E. 10 (1929); Sgarlot v. Diggory, 68 Pa. Super. Ct. 53 (1917).
608 [Vol. XXI
1971] CASE NOTES 609
owner's financial interest." a93 Mellon Bank's inaction could easily be at-
tributed to courtesy or neighborly accommodation. To hold otherwise
puts landowners in a very tenuous position. The mere erection of a
ladder to change a sign on a marquee may be analogous to the erection
of a ladder to change storm windows. The use of a neighbor's yard to
put up storm windows or clean them periodically should not amount to
the acquisition of a prescriptive easement. The decision in the instant
case is support for the proposition that it should.
In Stevenson v. Williams,9 4 the owner of a driveway let his neighbor
use it to get into his backyard. The testimony showed that they were
good friends, but there was no evidence of permission. The court was
hesitant to encumber the land with an easement without a clear showing
of adversity and hostility on the part of the user. Prescriptive rights
could not be established through indulgence, permission, or mutual ac-
commodation. As the use of the driveway began and continued as a re-
sult of friendly and accommodating permission, the claim for a prescrip-
tive right was rejected.95 In a case with similar facts, Bazell v. Cain,96
the driveway, after years of mutual use, was fenced down the middle by
the owner of one side. The court, when faced with the circumstances of
neighbors, mutual use, no permission, and inaction came to a conclusion
different than that in Hopkins. The court explained:
An acquiescence for long term of years of a way that may be partly on one side of
a boundary line and partly on the other side, and used mutually by both lot owners,
does not create a title in and to the land of another for the reason that such use is
not hostile or adverse. No easement can be acquired when a use is by express or
implied permission.9 7
In both the Stevenson and the Bazell cases, the use was for the mutual
accommodation of the adjoining property owners and no prescriptive
easements were acquired.
An easement by prescription will only be acquired if there is clear
and positive proof of its existence. 98 In Clarke v. Clarke,9 9 the plaintiff
93. Cretney, Wider Still and Wider, 119 NEw L.J. 192 (1969). In Boyden v.
Achenbach, 86 N.C. 383 (1882) the court said, "It would be unreasonable to de-
duce from the owner's quiet acquiescence, a simple act of neighborhood courtesy
• . . consequences so seriously detracting from the value of the land . . . and com-
pel him needlessly to interpose and prevent the enjoyment of the privilege. .....
Id. at 398-99.
94. Stevenson v. Williams, 188 Pa. Super. 49, 145 A.2d 734 (1958).
95. Id.
96. 285 Ala. 661, 235 So. 2d 805 (1970). See also Kirkland v. Kirkland, 281
Ala. 42, 198 So. 2d 771 (1967).
97. Bazzell v. Cain, supra note 96, at 665, 235 So. 2d at 808.
98. Pittsburgh & Lake Erie R.R. v. Township of Stowe, 374 Pa. 54, 96 A.2d 892
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owned a vacant lot on Railroad Street with a forty foot frontage. The
defendant walked and drove vehicles across the lot to and from his busi-
ness. The plaintiff at no time gave the defendant permission to use the
lot, but he had full knowledge of the use. The issue before the court
was whether or not the use was under a claim of right, or a mere matter
of neighborly accommodation, and the court held that a claim of right
that exists only in the mind of the claimant is not sufficient; it must be
communicated or conveyed to the owner. The owner's knowledge of the
use does not raise a presumption of hostility or that the use was under a
claim of right. The defendant was not allowed to gain title by prescrip-
tion when allowed to pass over the land by "silent permission"'100 be-
cause to hold a prescriptive easement in this case "would be a blot upon
the law."''1  The court agreed with the argument that when an owner
negligently fails to assert his rights when his property is subjected to a
hostile or adverse claim, he then loses. The court goes on to say:
But it by no means follows that the owner is negligent because he does acts of kind-
ness. Because he allows others to use and to travel over a vacant lot without ob-
jection, the law does not presume that he intended to give it to them. 102
The relationship between Mellon Bank and RKO-Theatre is most indic-
ative of an attitude of courtesy by the former and acceptance by the
latter. This relation would seem to be the most reasonable inference
drawn from the circumstances of the parties. To infer anything besides
neighborly accommodation would be to impute adversity and hostility
into a relationship that had none. Imposing the doctrine of an easement
by prescription on the set of facts in RKO-Theatre v. Mellon Bank might
eliminate a good deal of mutual kindness between neighbors.
[F]or if it were once understood that a land-owner, by allowing his neighbors or
the public to pass through his lands without objection over a passway which he
himself used, would thereby, after the lapse of twenty years, confer on such neigh-
bors, or any of them, the right to compel the way to be kept open for his or their
(1953); Bennett v. Biddle, 140 Pa. 396, 21 A. 363 (1891) where the court said
the jury must determine "whether this user has been a friendly exchange of advan-
tages, or whether each has entered and exercised a right of passage adversely to
the other. In the latter case only would the lapse of time give title." Id. at 404,
21 A. at 364.
99. 133 Cal. 667, 66 P. 10 (1901).
100. Id. at 670, 66 P. at 11. See Hopkins v. Hill, supra note 85.
101. Clarke v. Clarke, supra note 99, at 670, 66 P. at 11.
102. Clarke v. Clarke, supra note 99, at 671, 66 P. at 12. Accord, England v.
Ally Ong Hing, 105 Ariz. 65, 459 P.2d 498 (1969) (mere use is insufficient no-
tice); Eddy v. Demichelis, 100 Cal. App. 517, 280 P. 389 (1929) (no prescriptive
easement if license or neighborly accommodation); Grimmesey v. Kirtlan, 93
Cal. App. 658, 270 P. 243 (1928).
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benefit and enjoyment, a prohibition against all such travel would immediately en-
sue.
1 08
Had the public easement been absent in this case, the decision may
have gone the other way in favor of Mellon Bank. Such a decision
would have been in keeping with good public policy. The public ease-
ment clouded the issue of a prescriptive easement. The court discussed
the scope of a public easement rather than the basic standards required
to establish the elements of a prescriptive easement. The result is a
detrimental effect on neighborhood relations.
William Groebe
103. Reid v. Garnett, supra note 66, at 50, 43 S.E. at 183.
